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ABSTRACT

Current eﬀorts started in 2012 by the Association for
Psychological Science (APS) appear to be diﬀerent from previous
arguments against null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST),
which remained largely rhetorical without speciﬁc actions for
compliance by researchers in psychology. The APS advocacy
involves speciﬁc promising implementation tactics. The present
study examined the impact of those eﬀorts on replication and
statistical reporting practices in four psychology journals from
2011 and 2015. The results showed that amidst increased reporting of NHST statistics in 2015 compared to 2011 and an absence
of power reporting in the behavioral journals, there was
increased reporting of actual replications in Psychological
Science, paradoxically surpassing Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior, of CIs in all four journals, and of error bars
on graphs in Cognition and Behavioural Processes. These trends
suggest need for additional eﬀorts at propagating the APS initiatives to ensure greater impact in the broader psychological community. Additionally, psychologists from all domains need to
become advocates of best practices for sustainable impact.

Many introductory psychology textbooks open by describing the various approaches and
perspective in psychology. They often conclude that the common thread that holds the
various parts together is research method and the goals of the discipline as a science (e.g.,
Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, & Roy, 2007; Griggs, 2017; see also Myer & Dewall,
2017). It is alarming and disheartening, therefore, to ﬁnd that the ﬁeld is embroiled in what
amounts to a methodology crisis. The crisis has been brewing for decades now. There have
been many warning calls from various people, both within and outside the ﬁeld, about what
is wrong with our research practices, most especially concerning excessive reliance on null
hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) and the attendant publication bias (e.g., Bohannon,
2014; Fidler, Thomason, Cumming, Finch, & Leeman, 2004). Publication bias is just one
part of Townsend’s twin problems of persistent biases in psychology, the other being “the
heavy bias against replication” (2008, p. 4) stemming from prejudicial treatment of direct

replications by publication editors. There has been, also, a variety of replication failures of
important psychological research (e.g., Alcock, 2011; Bem, 2011; Cesario, 2014; Ritchie,
Wiseman, & French, 2012). This is the backdrop against which one maps the research
terrain in psychological science. A focal point of criticism besides the blind adoption of
NHST, of course, is the pervasive misinterpretations of what the p-value represents, ranging
from the misconception that it indicates an amount of certainty or conﬁdence about the
results of an experiment to the mistaken belief that it signiﬁes replicability upon repetition
of an experiment (Lambdin, 2012). Editors, reviewers, and authors commonly fall victim to
such misconceptions, inadvertently contributing to publication bias, and further weakening
the cumulative foundation of the science of psychology.
Broadly speaking, two disparate research approaches, namely, large-N group designs,
with their various complexities, and single-subject (Gast & Ledford, 2014; Sidman, 1960;
henceforth, small-N) designs, dominate psychology. This distinction probably is unique
today to psychology and allied sciences, although it has a long history in medicine
(Bernard, 1927/1957). The two approaches diﬀer in very important ways and by tradition. One of the major diﬀerences is the heavy reliance on inferential statistics in the
group designs than in small-N designs. Another important diﬀerence is the built-in
emphasis on replication and reproducibility of eﬀects in small-N designs than in the
large-N group designs. These particular diﬀerences suggest a diametrically opposed
impact of the methodology crisis in the diﬀerent specializations within psychology that
tend to adopt them, namely, group designs in cognitive psychology and small-N designs
in behavioral psychology. One could say without prejudice that what the one is doing or
experiencing because of the crisis is of no concern to the other, because of the apparent
gulf between the two approaches in psychology. In fact, however, behavior analysts have
been concerned and interested in the use of inferential statistics as attested to by the
debates, albeit from a behavioral perspective, on the pages of one of their “trade” journal,
namely, The Behavior Analyst (e.g., see Baron, 1999; Branch, 1999; Crosbie, 1999; Shull,
1999). The question is: if research method has been and continues to be the unifying force
that binds psychology together as a science, can we aﬀord to remain dispassionately
indiﬀerent to what goes on in the diﬀerent domains of psychology?
There is a diﬀerent kind of attention to the persistent crises of replication and
dependency on NHST in psychological research that is underway. Previously, there has
been an ongoing focus on the controversy of using and overusing, perhaps to the level of
abuse (cf. Goldstein, 1984), of NHST in psychology (Harlow, Mulaik, & Steiger, 1997;
Morrison & Henkel, 1970). Over the years, spanning many decades, many observers have
cautioned, campaigned, and repudiated the over-reliance on NHST from various backgrounds in psychology (Falk & Greenbaum, 1995; Morrison & Henkel, 1970; Rozeboom,
1960) and beyond (e.g., Fidler et al., 2004; Kern, 2014). Arguments have ranged from ﬁrm
support for (Chow, 1998; Frisk, 1996; Hagen, 1997) to suggestion of outright banning of
NHST in psychological research (Schmidt & Hunter, 1997) and many more in between
(e.g., Cohen, 1994; Mulaik, Raju, & Harshman, 1997; Serlin & Lapsley, 1985). It is safe to
say that over half a century of clamors for change have yielded little or no change at all.
Until recently, it has been just talking points, cautionary notes, rebukes, but little to no
systematic action. As Thompson aptly noted, despite having devoted many pages over
decades in its publications (e.g., Kline, 2013), the American Psychological Association
(APA) oﬃcial position as of the fourth edition of its Publication Manual amounted to

merely “encouraging” psychologists to report eﬀect sizes (ESs) (Thompson, 1999, p. 68),
for example (see also Fidler, 2010; Finch, Cumming, & Thomason, 2001). Subsequently,
the ﬁfth edition only provided tepid advocacy for the promotion of conﬁdence interval
(CI), graphically and otherwise (Fidler, 2010). The latest edition, improved on these only
to the extent of specifying how to report CIs and ESs and emphasizing meta-analysis, and
thus provides, at best, only words of “encouragements” to authors (see Fidler, 2010, p. 2;
Thompson, 1999). In 2012, the Association for Psychological Science (APS) initiated
a diﬀerent kind of advocacy eﬀorts to promote replications and better statistical practices.
Two notable diﬀerence from previous attempts in the current eﬀorts included 1) the
speciﬁc devotion of special issues in Perspectives in Psychological Science (PiPS) dedicated
to replicability and research practices in psychology (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012;
Spellman, 2012) and 2) the adoption of the New Statistics (e.g., Cumming, 2014a)
emphasizing the estimation approach over NHST in Psychological Science (PS).
Editorial determination at refreshingly tangible actions appears to be the hallmark of
the current eﬀorts (Eich, 2014; Lindsay, 2015).
Prior to the inception of the eﬀorts by the APS, others have reported on previous
reporting practices in psychology (e.g., Cumming et al., 2007a; Fidler et al., 2004; Finch
et al., 2001). Cumming et al., for example, found mixed results of reporting practices with
persistent heavy use of NHST, low use of 95% conﬁdence intervals (CI), increased use of
standard error (SE) of the mean over CI, and continued use of unidentiﬁed error bars on
graphs. Finch et al. (2004) reported similar trends in comparing authors who did or did not
publish in Memory & Cognition during the editorship of Geoﬀrey Loftus who tried to
enforce best practices in statistical reporting in that journal. Whereas 95% of these authors’
works reported NHST, only 5% reported CIs. They noted that “only around 22% of articles
[included CIs], about 40% . . . rely on NHST without interval estimation or visual displays of
data, and another 36% included conventional ﬁgures without error bars” (Finch et al., 2004,
p. 320). Finch et al. (2001) showed that historically entrenched practices of using relative as
opposed to exact p-values continued to encourage verbal fudging of reporting nonsigniﬁcance (such as in “approaching signiﬁcance,” p. 201) and poor reporting and interpretation
of CIs in journals like Journal of Applied Psychology.
Many observers of the various reporting practices of psychological research, including
those of the aforementioned reports, have been critical about such practices while recommending alternative, speciﬁc best practices. Prominent among these alternative best practices,
besides the strenuous objections to NHST, but some related to it, are: (1) report power
(needed with or without NHST for group designs); (2), if you have to at all, report exact p, not
relative p; (3) report ESs (as encouraged in the 6th edition of the APA manual); (4) use and
identify error bars on graphs and do not confuse SDs, SEs, and CIs in doing so; (5) report CI
instead of SE for inference purposes; and (6) report and interpret CIs instead of reporting
p-values. Two of these best practices deserve further comments. First, ESs are not limited to
the standard familiar ones like Cohen’s d or Hedge’s g. According to Cumming (2014b), ESs
also include the mean and mean diﬀerence, percentage and percentage change, correlation
(e.g., Pearson’s r), proportion variance (e.g., R2, η2, ω2, etc.), regression slope (b or β),
etc. Second, often there is confusion about reporting and use of the SD, the SE, and CIs,
perhaps because they are typically represented on graphs, albeit erroneously, as measures of
variability on point estimates, such as the mean. Of the three, only the SD is a descriptive
statistic of the sample, however; the CI is inferential, and SE is neither inferential. The SE is

the SD of the sampling distribution of the sample means, about twice the margin of error (or
MOE). The CI, in contrast, represents the MOE below and above the point estimate and tells
us something about where the population mean might reside, among other things (see
Cumming, 2014b). Reporting choices among these statistics, therefore, are important in
illuminating current reporting practices.
How widespread the problematic practices continue to be since 2012 when the APS
reform eﬀorts became widely publicized, therefore, is of interest. This is particularly so, in
light of the seriousness of these eﬀorts and the new rigor in their pursuit. Indeed, for example,
a more recent study reported continued use of the notion of “marginally signiﬁcant” to
describe “p values between .05 and .10” in various psychological ﬁelds (Olsson-Colletine, van
Assen, & Hartgerink, 2019, p. 1). What sorts of impact are these eﬀorts having on reporting
practices? Besides the editorial eﬀorts noted above, there have been, in addition, recent
educational eﬀorts in support of changing these practices. At annual meetings of the APS,
workshops on the new statistics, on open science fora, and on data handling, are frequently
oﬀered. How eﬀective have they been? There are diﬀerent approaches to answer such
question. One way is to explore reporting practices of authors of articles appearing in various
psychological journals for an extended period, including the period in question. This option
would require in depth analyses of reporting practices say, over a decade, to examine yearly
changes in those practices in multiple journals. Needless to say, that would require a great deal
of resources in time and eﬀort. Another approach is to select a few journals with varying
diversity of focus and take a snapshot of the practices in select volumes. In the present study,
we adopted the latter approach, examining research articles published in two behavioral
(Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (JEAB) and Behavioral Processes (BP)) and
two cognitive (Cognition and PS) journals right before (2011) and soon after (2015) the APS
eﬀorts became pronounced in 2012. We selected the ﬁrst three journals based on the
predominant subject-matter focus of the publications, two being behavioral and one being
cognitive, whereas we chose the last one because, in addition to being mainly cognitive in
focus, it provides a direct comparison to the other three non-APS journals, as a primary
publication of the APS, the main organization advocating the current reform eﬀorts in
psychology.
The rationale for examining behavioral vs. cognitive journals is twofold. First, behavioral
research tends to emphasize replication by virtue of the inherent comparisons required for
experimental manipulations in small-N designs (Sidman, 1960; see Imam, 2018). For that
reason, one would not expect the replication crisis in psychology at large to manifest in the
area of behavioral research. It remains an empirical question, however, especially in light of
the next consideration. Second, to the extent that authors publishing in the behavioral
journals may deploy statistical analyses such as NHST that is commonly used in group
designs (e.g., Zimmermann, Watkins, & Poling, 2015), in what way(s) have the concerns
and tribulations about the over-reliance on NHST in psychology in general, with their
pertinent recommended solutions, inﬂuenced reporting practices in behavioral research?
The present study examined how reporting of replication and statistics may have
changed, in the year immediately preceding the wide dissemination of the APS eﬀorts in
2012 and three years after, to assess the comparative impact of the eﬀorts. We considered
reports of replication, or its absence, of NHST in general, and of other speciﬁc statistical
measures and considerations often recommended as essential to proper understanding of
the role of statistics in psychological research; the latter included power, the use of error

bars on graphs, diﬀerentiating SDs and SEs and reporting CIs, and ESs, including those
identiﬁed above for best practices. As indicated in the preceding paragraph, if replication
is central to behavioral analytic research, one would expect superior replication reporting
in the behavioral journals compared to the cognitive journals, on the one hand, and less
reporting of statistical measures and practices that are more germane to group designs
commonly used in the rest of psychology, on the other hand. If the APS eﬀorts are having
an impact, reporting and practices should reﬂect the recommended solutions typically
oﬀered to researchers in extant psychology; namely, more power-, CI-, error-bar reporting and less NHST-statistics in the mainstream cognitive journals.

Method
Data collection and analyses
We examined 1,157 research articles from four journals in psychology (see Table 1).
Articles and entries in these journals that were excluded from analysis variously included
memorials, corrigenda, errata and retractions, acknowledgements and letters, book reviews,
technical notes, preface, simulations, some perspectives and commentaries, theoretical and
review articles, editorials, and publisher note.
We tallied frequencies of “replication” and mentions of associated terms, including
“replicable,” “replicability,” “reproducible,” and “reproducibility,” in the journals in the
2011 and 2015 volumes, excluding studies reporting “statistical replications.” This approach
is similar to that of Makel, Plucker, and Hegarty (2012) in which they used the “replicat*
search term. A hit on a search term in the present study triggered a check on whether an
actual replication was conducted or not, and tallies of direct vs. systematic replications were
made respectively (see supplements). In addition, tallies of various NHST and estimation
statistics included, but were not limited to, the mean (M), median, and mode, the standard
deviation (SD), range, minimum and maximum, proportions, and percentages (descriptive
Table 1. Summary of the journals analyzed with some NHST statistics including total t, F, others (χ2, z, and
Mann Whitney U).
NHST Statistics
Journal
Cognitive Journals
COG
Total
PS

Year

No. of Articles

No. of Vol/Issues

t

F

Others

2011
2015

149
196
345
234
181
415

2
2
4
3
12
15

9
18
24
34
82
116

11
19
30
73
113
186

0
12
12
26
92
118

43
50
93
127
177
304
1157

4
12
16
1 (12)
1 (12)
2 (24)

82
130
212
201
199
400
752

104
117
221
221
190
411
848

54
85
139
103
115
218
487

2011
2015

Total
Behavioral Journals
JEAB
2011
2015
Total
BP
2011
2015
Total
Grand Total

Notes. COG: Cognition; PS: Psychological Science; JEAB: Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior; BP: Behavioural Processes

statistics); the χ2, z, Mann Whitney U, t, and F statistics, p-value (exact vs. relative), and power
(inferential statistics); and SE, CI, η2, partial η2, ω2, Cohen’s d, r, R2, and variance accounted
for (estimation approach). CI reporting tallies included interpretations of CI based on interval
bounds, interval width, CIs overlap, or non-zero overlap. Statistics encountered but not
counted included β, α, b, semi partial r2, RMSEA, MSE, Spearman rho, Cohen’s k, prep,
and W.
To tally power reporting, search words included “power,” “sample size,” and/or “eﬀect
size.” Explicit statements of power determinations were counted for each experiment in an
article, usually before the results section in each journal. References to power or power-related
issues, usually in results and/or discussion sections, counted as implicit reporting of power
(see Fidler et al., 2004) and were speciﬁcally not counted as power (Simmons, Nelson, &
Simonsohn, 2011). Many studies referred to sample-size determinations in terms of “same as
in previous studies,” referencing speciﬁc studies; these counted in a separate category reported
here as SAP in the present study. A number of articles reported using “pilot” studies to
determine sample size; one article employed “pretesting,” and another used “post hoc.”
Encounters of “sample size determined in advance” without specifying how, or manipulations, statistical and otherwise, performed to “increase” power, did not count for power
reporting. Tallies also included use of graphs and error bars, as well as reporting of missing
data. The supplements accompanying the manuscript present the detail tallies for all journals.
To analyze the data, we computed the proportion of articles reporting each measure of
interest and their respective 95% CIs using the ESCI program for the latest edition of
Cumming’s textbook (Cumming & Calin-Jageman, 2017), speciﬁcally the Two-Proportions
tab of Chapters 10–16 of the software. The tab also allowed for computation of proportion
diﬀerences for a given comparison of proportions of a measure. We report both of these in
either graphical (for visual comparisons) and/or tabular (for completeness) forms. Two types
of graphs are presented; ﬁrst, those for presentation of proportions of reporting practices for
each of the journals (Figures 1, 4, and 5) and those for pairwise comparisons of various
journals on diﬀerent measures (Figures 2, 3, and 6–7). Asterisks on the ﬁrst set of graphs
indicate proportion diﬀerences for the tagged comparisons did not contact or overlap with
zero on the diﬀerence axis and therefore considered signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.

Results
In the graphs depicting diﬀerences in point and interval estimates throughout the paper, if the
95% CIs on the proportion diﬀerences do not overlap zero on the diﬀerence axis, the
diﬀerence indicates a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (Cumming & Calin-Jageman, 2017). The results
are presented separately for replication reporting and statistical reporting.
Replication reporting
Reporting of replication was multidimensional across the four journals with three replication
categories (none, actual, and a mention) in two years (2011 and 2015) as shown in Figure 1;
the actual replications combined direct and systematic replications tallies. As such, multiple
layers of comparisons are possible. First, Figure 1 shows that all journals reported higher no
replications than actual replications and replication mentions, respectively, with the exception
of JEAB in 2011 recording the highest actual replications compared to all other journals in
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Figure 1. Proportion of articles (and their 95% CIs) reporting no replications, actual replications, and
mentions of replication in the behavioral (left panel) and cognitive (right panel) journals published in 2011
and 2015. * indicates signiﬁcant comparisons based on proportion diﬀerences during each publication year
for each journal.

both years. Figure 1 also shows that the journals reported at least 25% replication mentions in
2011, while reporting above 25% in 2015, except PS reporting only 9% replication
mentions. Second, various other comparisons of proportions of the replication categories
for 2011 and 2015 across the behavioral and cognitive journals revealed important diﬀerences, some of which are shown in separate data sets presented in the appendix. For example,
data for the individual journals compared by publication year showed that only JEAB
recorded a signiﬁcant decline in actual replications in 2015 whereas PS recorded
a signiﬁcant decrease in no replications with a corresponding increase in actual replications
and replication mentions in 2015; all other comparisons showed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
(see Figure 1A in the appendix). Figure 2 compares the replication categories by year of
publication for each journal. Figure 2 shows that whereas reporting diﬀerences in JEAB in
2011 were signiﬁcant for no replication vs. actual replications on the one hand, and actual
replications vs. replication mentions on the other, none of the diﬀerences in 2015 were
signiﬁcant. The signiﬁcant diﬀerences in JEAB in 2011 both favored actual replications. In
contrast to JEAB, all the diﬀerences in replication reporting in both years were signiﬁcant in
BP; none of them, however, favored actual replications or replication mentions. The same was
true for both Cognition and PS in both years, except for the replication reporting diﬀerence in
both years for PS in which actual replications surpassed replication mentions, but more so in
2015 (see Figure 2).

JEAB
2011

Behavioural Processes
2015

2011

Cognition

2015

2011

Psychological Science
2015

2011

2015

None vs. Replication Mention

Proportion

None vs. Actual Replication

Actual vs. Replication Mention

Figure 2. Cross comparisons of proportion of articles reporting no replication (None) vs. replication
mention (RM) (top rows) no replication (None) vs. actual replications (AR) (middle row), and actual vs.
replication mentions (bottom row) in all journals showing their proportion diﬀerences with the respective 95% CIs, which signify signiﬁcant diﬀerences when they do not overlap zero on the diﬀerence axis.

JEAB vs. Cognition
2011

2015

JEAB vs. Psychological Science
2011

2015

BP vs. Cognition
2011

2015

BP vs. Psychological Science
2011

2015

No Replication

Proportion

Replication Mention

Actual Replication

Figure 3. Cross comparisons of proportion of articles reporting no replication (top) replication
mentions (middle), and actual replications (bottom) in BP vs. cognition (left of left-half panel) and
BP vs. PS (right of left-half panel) and in JEAB vs. cognition (left of right-half panel) and JEAB vs. PS
(right of right-half panel) showing their proportion diﬀerences with the respective 95% CIs, which
signify signiﬁcant diﬀerences when they do not overlap zero on the diﬀerence axis.

Figure 4. Proportions and proportion diﬀerence (with their respective 95% CI) of articles reporting exact (E)
and relative (R) p-values across the behavioral journals and cognitive journals published in 2011 and 2015.

Comparisons of proportions of replication reporting by replication categories
between the two behavioral and the two cognitive journals, respectively, revealed
that the behavioral journals showed that reporting of no replication was signiﬁcantly
higher in BP than in JEAB but reporting of actual replications was higher in JEAB
than in BP in both years (see Figure 2A, left panel in the appendix). Thus, although
JEAB reported signiﬁcantly more actual replications than BP in both years, the
diﬀerence in replication reporting markedly declined in 2015. Whereas no replication reporting was signiﬁcantly lower in PS than in Cognition in 2015 and in both
years for replication mentions, actual replications were signiﬁcantly higher in PS
than in Cognition in 2015 (see Figure 2A, right panel, in the appendix).
Figure 3 presents cross comparisons between JEAB and the cognitive journals on the one
hand, and between BP and the cognitive journals, on the other. Cross-comparisons between
JEAB and Cognition showed that reporting no replication was signiﬁcantly higher in
Cognition than in JEAB in 2011, whereas actual replication reporting was higher in JEAB
than in Cognition in both years (see Figure 3, left half). Cross-comparisons between JEAB
and PS showed that all categories of replication-reporting diﬀerences were signiﬁcant only
in 2011, with higher no-replication diﬀerence in PS than in JEAB, but higher replication
mentions and actual replications in JEAB than in PS. In 2015, there were virtually no
diﬀerences on the three categories of replication reporting between the two journals (see
Figure 3, right of left-half). Thus, whereas JEAB reported more actual replications than
Cognition in both years, the diﬀerence not only declined in comparison to Cognition
(Figure 3, left half,), it virtually disappeared in comparison to PS in 2015 (Figure 3, right
of left-half). Finally, actual and no replication reporting were not diﬀerent between BP and
Cognition in both years (see Figure 3, left of right-half) and between BP and PS in 2011
(Figure 3, right half); replication mentions in 2011 were signiﬁcantly higher in PS than in

Figure 5. Proportion of articles reporting various eﬀect size measures including mean, mean diﬀerence
(MnDiﬀ), proportion and percentage (Prop/%), odds ratio and relative risk (OR/RR), correlation (r), R2 and
variance accounted for (R2/VAC), η2 (eta2), partial η2 (part. eta2), and Cohen’s d in the behavioral journals
(left panel) and the cognitive journals (right panel) published in 2011 and 2015. * indicates signiﬁcant
diﬀerences (see Table 1A in the appenndix for these and other diﬀerences discussed in text).

BP. In 2015, however, PS recorded signiﬁcantly more actual replications and less no
replication than BP did (Figure 3, right half).
All in all, then, replication reporting across the two years indicate two notable results. First,
there was a decline in actual replications in 2015 in the lone star on replications in 2011,
namely JEAB. Second, there was an increase in actual replications and replication mentions in
PS in 2015.
Statistical reporting
Various statistical reporting patterns are discernable from the results, including on NHST,
power, exact vs. relative p-value, ES measures, SD vs. SE, CIs and error bars on graphs. As
shown in Table 1, reporting of key NHST statistics such as the t- and F-tests, as well the
others including χ2, z, and Mann Whitney U tests, increased in all journals except in BP in
2015 compared to 2011. For the cognitive journals, Cognition recorded greater increases in
reporting of these statistics than PS in 2015, 50%, 58%, and 100% vs. 41%, 65%, and 28%,

Behavioral Journals
SD

SE
JEAB

Proportion

BP

Cognitive Journals
SD

SE
Cognition

PS

JEAB vs. BP (2011)

Cognition vs. PS (2011)

JEAB vs. BP (2015)

Cognition vs. PS (2015)

Figure 6. Proportions and proportion diﬀerences (with their respective 95% CI) of articles reporting
SDs and SEs in the respective behavioral and cognitive journals (left of each panel) and their
comparisons (right of each panel) during the 2011 and 2015 publication years.

Proportion

Behavioral Journals

Cognitive Journals

JEAB

Cognition

BP

PS

JEAB vs. BP (2011)

Cognition vs. PS (2011)

JEAB vs. BP (2015)

Cognition vs. PS (2015)

Figure 7. Proportions and proportion diﬀerences (with their respective 95% CI) of articles reporting CIs
in the respective behavioral and cognitive journals (left panel) and their comparisons (right panel)
published in 2011 and 2015.

respectively, for t, F, and others. For the behavioral journals, JEAB recorded greater
increases than BP in 2015, 63%, 88%, and 64% vs. .99% decrease, .86% decrease, and .9%
increase, respectively, for t, F, and others. Collectively, the four journals showed 76%, 93%,
and 60% respectively for t, F, and the other statistical tests.
Power
Despite the substantial amount of reporting of the NHST statistics, reporting of statistical
power usage, comparatively, were minimal (see Table 2). Table 2 shows that the generally
low levels of power reporting nevertheless reﬂect increased reporting of the various
power formats from 2011 to 2015, especially in the explicit, implicit, and same as in
previous study (SAPS) categories; JEAB was an exception to these, showing no reporting
at all of any of the categories except implicit in 2015. Table 2 also shows that whereas
Cognition and PS reported more implicit power than explicit power in 2011, they
reported the latter more than the former in 2015; both behavioral journals did not report
explicit power at all in both years.
Exact vs. relative p-values
All journals reported both exact and relative p-values in both years about equally; only
the reporting for 2011 in PS was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent with more relative than exact
p-values reported. A comparison of relative vs. exact p-value across all journals showed
a small but signiﬁcant diﬀerence in reporting of relative over exact p-value as shown in
Figure 4. None of the proportion diﬀerences on exact vs. relative p-value reporting across
publication years in all journals was signiﬁcant.
Eﬀect size measures
Reporting of the various ESs mentioned in the introduction showed interesting commonalities and diﬀerences across the four journals. For one, all journals reported the
Table 2. Power reporting in each journal in 2011 and 2015 showing the numbers reported explicitly
(explicit), implicitly (implicit), in terms of same as in previous study (SAPS), pilot, or others (pretesting
and post hoc).
Power Reporting
Journals
Cognitive Journals
COG
Total
PS

Year

Explicit

Implicit

SAPS

Pilot

Others

2011
2015

1
13
14
7
62
69

8
14
22
20
40
60

0
10
10
0
41
41

0
1
1
0
9
9

0
0
0
0
2
2

0
0
0
0
0
0
83

0
4
4
2
8
10
96

0
0
0
0
1
1
52

0
0
0
0
0
0
10

0
0
0
0
0
0
2

2011
2015

Total
Behavioral Journals
JEAB
Total
BP
Total
Grand Total

2011
2015
2011
2015

mean and proportions/percentages a lot more than all other ESs in both years as shown in
Figure 5, although only the proportion/percentage decline for JEAB and increases for
Cognition and PS across 2011 and 2015 were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. For another, the other
ESs were reported relatively less frequently across all journals except for PS in which the
reporting of r, partial η2 and Cohen’s d was comparatively higher than the other journals
(see Figure 5). Of these other ESs, partial η2 reporting was signiﬁcantly better in 2015
than 2011 for Cognition, PS, and BP, but only so for Cohen’s d in PS and BP, and only η2
for BP. In addition, notably, there was virtual absence of reporting of η2, partial η2 and
Cohen’s d in the behavioral journals (see Figure 5, left panel) compared to the cognitive
journals (see Figure 5, right panel) in 2011. The increased reporting in the behavioral
journals in 2015 were only signiﬁcant for BP. The two cognitive journals reported these
eﬀect sizes in both years, mostly showing increases in 2015 over 2011, but only those for
partial η2 in both journals and Cohen’s d in PS were signiﬁcant (see Figure 5, right panel).
Table 1A in the appendix presents the proportion diﬀerences and their CIs that conﬁrm
these ﬁndings.
Standard deviation and standard error
Although the two cognitive journals reported more SDs in both years compared to the
two behavioral journals, the proportion diﬀerences in the two years for all four journals
were not signiﬁcant except for PS, which recorded signiﬁcantly more SDs in 2015 than in
2011 (see Figure 6, left panels). In both years, JEAB reported signiﬁcantly more SDs than
PB, but the PS reported signiﬁcantly more SDs than Cognition only in 2015 (see Figure 6,
right panels). Figure 6 also shows that whereas there was no diﬀerence in SE-reporting in
both years in the cognitive journals, there was signiﬁcantly more SE reporting in 2015
than in 2011 in BP (left panels). Reporting of SE was signiﬁcantly higher in PS than in
Cognition in both years, but only so for BP compared to JEAB in 2015 (see Figure 6, right
panels). Although the two cognitive journals reported CIs more in 2015 than in 2011, PS
reported CIs substantially more in 2015 than in 2011.
Conﬁdence interval
Although CI reporting in JEAB was virtually nil in both years, of the two behavioral
journals, only BP recorded more CI reporting in 2015 than in 2011 (see left panels,
Figure 7). In both years, BP recorded signiﬁcantly more CIs than JEAB, whereas PS did
so over Cognition only in 2015 (see right panels, Figure 7).
The details of the CI reporting in these journals presented in Table 3 depict
various outcomes. The table shows that more experiments in all four journals
reported CIs in 2015 than in 2011. Collectively, the four journals reported more
CIs in text (166/361 or 46%) than graphically (136/361 or 38%), with the least
reporting in tabular form (59/361 or 16%). Individually, whereas Cognition reported
more CIs graphically (8/12 or 67%) than both in text and in tables (2/12 or 17%
each) in 2011, there were more textual (24/44 or 55%) than graphical (12/44 or
27%), then tabular (8/44 or 18%) in 2015. In PS, similarly, there was more CI
reporting graphically (15/27 or 56%) than textual (10/27 or 37%) and tabular (2/27
or 7%) reporting in 2011, but more textual (120/241 or 50%) than graphical (81/241
or 33%), then tabular (40/241 or 17%) in CI reporting in 2015.

Table 3. Conﬁdence interval (CI) reporting in each journal showing the number of experiments
reporting, reporting format (graphical, tabular, or textual), and the number interpreting CIs (Total)
in the form of interval bounds (IB), interval width (IW), overlap (OL), or non-zero (NZ) interpretation in
2011 and 2015.
CI Reporting
Journals
Year
Cognitive Journals
COG
2011
2015
Total
PS
2011
2015
Total
Behavioral Journals
JEAB
2011
2015
Total
BP
2011
2015
Total
Grand Total

CI Interpretation

No. of Experiments

Graph

Table

Text

IB

IW

OL

NZ

Total (%)

12
36
48
26
181
207

8
12
20
15
81
96

2
8
10
2
40
42

2
24
26
10
120
130

0
1
1
0
2
2

0
2
2
0
1
1

0
1
1
0
1
1

1
3
4
1
11
12

1(8)
7(16)
8(14)
1(3)
15(6)
16(4)

1
2
3
5
25
30
288

0
2
2
4
14
18
136

0
0
0
0
7
7
59

0
1
1
0
9
9
166

0
0
0
0
0
0
3

0
0
0
0
0
0
3

0
0
0
0
3
3
5

1
0
1
1
0
1
18

1(100)
0(0)
1(100)
1(25)
3(17)
4(12)
29(8)

Together, the cognitive journals tended to report CIs textually (156/324 or 48%) than
graphically (116/324 or 36%) or in tables (52/324 or 16%). In contrast, the behavioral
journals tended to report CIs graphically (20/37 or 54%) than in tabular (7/37 or 19%) or
textual (10/37 or 27%) forms. Whereas CI reporting in JEAB was virtually nil with only
one reporting in 2011 and very limited with only three in 2015, it was a little better in BP
in both years. All CI reporting in 2011 was graphical (4/4 or 100%) in BP, in contrast to
2015 with 47% (14/30) graphical, 30% (9/30) tabular, and 23% (7/30) textual CI reporting.
Of the total CI reporting in each journal, in 2011, there was only one (8% and 3%
respectively) CI interpretation in Cognition and PS, increasing to seven and 15 (16% and
6%, respectively) in 2015; BP reported only one and three representing 25% and 17%,
respectively, in 2011 and 2015. Collectively, CI interpretation was more non-zero (62%)
than overlap (24%) interpretations, and least based on interval bounds or width interpretations, at 10% each, in all four journals. Whereas cognitive journals recorded more
non-zero (67%) than any other interpretations, the behavioral journals reported using
more overlap interpretations (60%) than any other form of interpretation.
Error bars
Error bars appeared on graphs in both the cognitive and the behavioral journals, but
on some more than on others; generally more in the cognitive than in the behavioral journals. For the behavioral journals, in both years, error bars appeared
signiﬁcantly more on BP than on JEAB graphs. In contrast, for the cognitive
journals, graphs in Cognition contained more error bars than those in PS, but
signiﬁcantly so only in 2011 (see Figure 8, right panels). Figure 8 also shows that
the proportion diﬀerence in error-bar usage in both years for each journal except
PS, were not signiﬁcant, although there was signiﬁcant increase in error-bar use in
PS in 2015 compared to 2011, as shown in the right panels of Figure 8.

Pro ortion

Behavioral Journals

Cognitive Journals

JEAB

Cognition

BP

PS

JEAB vs. BP (2011)

Cognition vs. PS (2011)

JEAB vs. BP (2015)

Cognition vs. PS (2015)

Figure 8. Proportions and proportion diﬀerences (with their respective 95% CI) of articles reporting
error bars on graphs in the respective behavioral and cognitive journals (left panel) and their
comparisons (right panel) published in 2011 and 2015.

Discussion
Has the recent APS eﬀorts on promoting better replication and statistical reporting
practices began to have a demonstrable impact on journal publications in psychology?
How widespread is such an impact? The present study adopted a snapshot approach to
answer these questions, by selecting a couple of behavioral and of cognitive journals (one of
which is an APS publication) published before and after the APS eﬀorts became widely
disseminated in 2012. Of the four journals included in the present study, pre-initiative
(2011) reporting of actual replications was highest only for JEAB; post-initiative (2015),
however, this reversed in favor of PS only, as all the other journals declined in their
reporting of actual replications in 2015 compared to 2011. Across the years, actual replications remained high for JEAB than for Cognition, although less so in 2015 than in 2011. In
all cross-comparisons of actual replications, replications tended to be lower in Cognition
than in all other journals, except in BP; the huge diﬀerence in actual replications between
JEAB and PS in 2011 had collapsed by 2015 and the gap in actual replications between PS
and BP in 2011 grew in 2015.
One cannot help but notice the paradox of JEAB recording less replication than PS in 2015
given JEAB’s reputation on use of small-N designs that requires replicating experimental
conditions as a matter of course. Whereas JEAB’s replication decline that year remains
inexplicable, PS’s replication increase is attributable to the current reform eﬀorts of the
APS. In both years, the decline in actual replications recorded in 2015 by the other three
journals dampens the good news in the burst in actual replications observed in PS, being the
only APS journal included in the present study. The relatively high levels of mentions of
replication in these three journals in both years did not make up for this laxity in actual
replications; if only actual replications could rise to the levels of replication mentions!
As indicated by Makel et al. (2012), it is diﬃcult to characterize accurately the level of
replication in the literature if authors do not refer to the fact that their study was actually
a replication study. Relying heavily on search terms could be a shortcoming of the present
study, although actual replications were assessed during a hit on the search terms. Actual
replications, therefore, provided an important index on the impact of the APS eﬀorts on
replication reports. In this regard, the decline in actual replications in JEAB in 2015 is
alarming in light of the emphases usually placed on replications in behavior analytic research.
A small-N approach to research would, more likely than not, warrant a declaration of
replication of experimental conditions in the course of describing the procedures. The decline
in actual replications that year, therefore, is not likely due to nondeclaration by authors, as
implied by Makel et al.’s noted observation. Perhaps the culprit is more likely the growing use
of human participants in behavior analytic research that may have been accompanied by the
use of group designs being published in JEAB that peaked during the 2010s (Zimmermann
et al., 2015). Indeed, Zimmermann et al. reported a concomitant increase in the use of
inferential (NHST) statistics in the journal as well. Whether 2015 was just an aberration in
JEAB regarding the recorded decline in actual replications reporting remains an empirical
question.
Contrary to what one might expect given the common diﬀerences outlined in the
introduction between cognitive and behavioral approaches in psychology, the results of
the present study showed substantial reporting of NHST statistics in the behavioral
journals in both years in the present study (see Table 1). In addition, the generally high

reporting of NHST across all journals of 76%, 93%, and 60% for t, F, and the other
statistics surveyed in the present study, and the percent of F-reporting in particular is
consistent with those reported by Finch et al. (2004) for Memory & Cognition.
Furthermore, all journals, behavioral and cognitive alike, showed increased reporting
of HNST statistics in 2015 compared to 2011 and yet with little corresponding increase in
reporting of power, especially in the behavioral journals; at least, the cognitive journals
relatively increased reporting of various categories of power. The generally low levels of
power reporting are similar to those reported by Fidler et al. (2004) for two medical
journals with similarly high NHST reporting records. Given the aforementioned substantially high reporting of NHST statistics in the behavioral journals in both years,
consistent with previous reports of growing use of group designs in JEAB in recent years
(Zimmermann et al., 2015), for example, it is concerning that power reporting in the
behavioral journals were virtually non-existent except for the implicit category for BP.
The virtual absence of power reporting in the behavioral journals perhaps may be due to
the generally ad hoc nature of the use of NHST and/or inadequate training in the use of
group-design statistics in behavioral psychology, which usually is more disposed to
small-N design approach to the evaluations of data (Gast & Ledford, 2014; Sidman, 1960).
All journals reported p-values as exact or relative values indiscriminately in both years,
except PS reporting more relative than exact p-values in 2011. The indiscriminate
reporting of exact and relative p-values remains problematic across the board and is
consistent with Finch et al.’s (2001) report of practices in the Journal of Applied
Psychology. Authors seem not to have gotten the message about the oft-cited preference
for exact p-values as best practice in reporting NHST statistics. This is one area of best
practices where editorial imperative (Imam, 2018) can have an immediate impact by
simply requesting reporting of exact ps.
Of the nonstandardized ESs recorded in the present study, both behavioral and cognitive
journals showed high frequency reporting of the mean and proportion/percentage measures in both years compared to all other ES measures, although JEAB, Cognition, and PS
involved signiﬁcant diﬀerences in these measures. These results are very consistent with
those reported particularly for Epidemiology and in part for the American Journal of Public
Health by Fidler et al. (2004); in the latter journal, there was less reporting of means and
mean diﬀerences than in Epidemiology. The three standardized ESs (η2, partial η2, and
Cohen’s d) recorded in the present study appear to have revealed better prospects in
showing increases in 2015 compared to 2011, especially in BP and Cognition, but particularly in PS, in support of the current eﬀorts initiated by the APS.
The common refrain about the use of SDs and SEs, in text or on graphs by authors, is
that they tend to be used interchangeably as measures of variability and as if they are both
descriptive statistics (see Cumming, Fidler, & Vaux, 2007b). As Cumming et al. elucidated, however, one (SD) is a descriptive statistic and the other (SE) is neither descriptive
nor inferential, only CI is inferential. Accordingly, use of error bars on graphs can be very
confusing and deceptive, therefore, especially when they are not identiﬁed appropriately,
if at all. In the present study, only BP and PS showed signiﬁcant increases respectively in
SE- and SD- reporting in 2015 compared to 2011. Although error-bar reporting was
recorded by most of the journals in the present study, they were not as high as those
reported previously for various journals by Cumming et al. (2007a). With respect to CI
reporting, whereas JEAB reporting of CI was abysmally low at near-zero in both years, the

other three journals increased CI reporting in 2015 over 2011, the greatest increase being
in PS, a most encouraging development in light of the journal’s home and providing
further evidence for eﬀectiveness of the current reform eﬀorts. Although the present
analysis did not diﬀerentiate reporting of SDs and SEs by graphical, textual, or tabular
formats as was done with CIs, the use of error bars other than CI remains a concerning
practice in light of persistent recommendations to the contrary (Cumming, Fidler,
Kalinowski, & Lai, 2012; Cumming et al., 2007a; Cumming & Finch, 2005). It is one
thing to use error bars at all and another to identify what they represent on the graphs
they accompany. Yet another though, and perhaps more importantly, is the preference
for error bars to be CI rather than SE (see Cumming, 2009), or anything else for that
matter, due to what Cumming et al. refer to as its “inferential information” value (2012,
p. 144). That CIs are not “descriptive” statistics as SDs are, needs better appreciation in
psychological research reporting and cannot be overemphasized (see Cumming et al.,
2007b). Finally, CI interpretations were largely of the nonzero variety in the two cognitive
journals that showed an increase in CI-interpretation reporting in 2015 in the present
study.
The foregoing suggests that whereas there have been certain areas of improvement in
reporting of both replication and statistical results in both the cognitive and the behavioral journals examined in the present study, a number of areas remain problematic
toward achieving best practices in psychological science reporting. Together, they implicate collective lines of action by relevant institutions and/or organizations in psychology
(see Imam, 2018). For example, the Loftus editorial experience in Memory & Cognition of
having to correct authors’ errors on submissions (Fidler et al., 2004) reveals the limits of
rules and rule-governed behaviors compared to contingency-managed behavior; what is
needed is beyond editorial policies (e.g., Fan & Thompson, 2001) and practices. The APA
Manual and an editorial policy represent rules that alone or together are inadequate in
maintaining sustained impact on reporting practices (see Fidler et al., 2004). Editorial
accept-reject decisions on manuscripts represent the point of exerting contingency on
what is appropriate or acceptable to the research community. There have to be consequences as a bridge between the rules and the outcomes or practices. Debate and focus
should be on identifying eﬀective strategies for contingency management at all levels,
from the classroom to the grant funding bodies. Lilienfeld (2017) is exemplary on
delineating what goes on in awarding grants, just as Koole and Lakens (2012) have
outlined workable incentive regimes that would promote replications in extant psychological research. Ator (1999) provides cogent examples why there might be a drift, even in
behavior analysis at that, to the adoption of NHST. Pinpointing what works and how
well, to what is the best way to advance the science of psychology regardless of its various
domains and subdivisions is what is required at this juncture. Deliberate outreach also is
called for in the current eﬀorts in light of increasing use of NHST by authors publishing
in behavioral journals such as JEAB (see Zimmermann et al., 2015), lest there remain
pockets of resistance in adopting acceptable NHST practices that may linger.
Furthermore, eﬀorts have to extend to training that promotes curricula emphases (e.g.,
Fidler, 2010) for both current and future researchers in psychology and associated
disciplines, including undergraduate and graduate training, in order to ensure adequate
acquisition of desirable requisite research behaviors and reporting practices.

The results of the present study also suggest that the new eﬀorts of the APS are
beginning to have some impact as illustrated by some increased reporting of replications
especially in PS, of CIs in all four journals, and of error bars on graphs in Cognition and
BP. Thus, change appears to be happening already, but it should not be limited to the
pages of APS journals. A concerted eﬀort is required to expand the reach of the impact of
the new approaches spearheaded by the APS to tackling the menace that NHST poses to
psychological science. All psychologists in all domains of psychology should own these
eﬀorts and become advocates for these new practices in a sustainable version. Only then
can psychology as a discipline hope to survive the scourge of mindless applications of
NHST to the design, analysis, and interpretation of psychological research. The fact is
that, contrary to popular believe, as noted earlier, behavior analysts have been engaged in
the debates on the use of inferential statistics and how it impacts psychological research
(e.g., Baron, 1999; Branch, 1999; Crosbie, 1999; Shull, 1999). As modern psychology
struggles to ﬁnd and consolidate its new identity on its quest for self-examination and
self-discovery (see Barrett, 2016, for example), at some point, psychologists have to come
to grips with whether and when experimental control (Perone, 1999) weighs more than
statistical control in psychological research. Future research on topics like this should
consider a look at other journals in the ﬁeld that might shed further light on the growth
and advancement of best practices in conducting and reporting sound researchin psychological science.
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.008 [−.065, .087]
−.016 [−.056, .008]

.038 [−.047, .126]
.178
[.13, .232]a

Prp
dif

Prop/%

.211
.084

.142
.187

Prop
diﬀ

[−.077, .433]
[.01, .153]a

[.017, .259]a
[.092, .278]a

CI

partial η2

.00
.137

.086
.34

Prop
diﬀ

[−.259, .168]
[.056, .215]a

[−.033, .193]
[.244, .427]a

CI

Cohen’s d

Table 1A. Proportion diﬀerences (Prp dif) and their 95% conﬁdence intervals (CI) for proportions of articles’ reporting of mean, mean diﬀerence, proportion (prop)
and percentage (%), odds ratio (OR), relative risk (RR), correlation (r), and R2 and variance accounted for (VAC), η2, partial η2, and Cohen’s d in the cognitive (top
panel; cognition (COG) and psychological science (PS)) and behavioral (bottom panel; journal of the experimental analysis of behavior (JEAB) and behavioural
processes (BP)) journals in 2011 compared to 2015 (see Figure 5).

APPENDIX

Figure 1A. Comparisons of proportion of articles reporting no replication, replication mention, and
actual replications in the two behavioral journals (left panel) and the two cognitive journals (right
panel) across the two publication years (2011 vs. 2015) showing their proportion diﬀerences with the
respective 95% CIs, which signify signiﬁcant diﬀerences when they do not overlap zero on the
diﬀerence axis.

Figure 2A. Cross comparisons of proportion of articles reporting no replication (top) replication
mentions (middle), and actual replications (bottom) in JEAB vs. BP (left panel) and cognition vs. PS
(right panel) showing their proportion diﬀerences with the respective 95% CIs, which signify signiﬁcant diﬀerences when they do not overlap zero on the diﬀerence axis.

